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A plant closes unexpectedly. Workers are laid off, perhaps permanently.
Their misfortune catches the attention of network news. Less is heard of
those employees who have already retired before the plant closes.
The benefits for retired employees are often negotiated by employers and
unions. But negotiators seldom make conscious provision for the effect of a
total plant closure on retirees. Retirees' pension benefits are now extensively
regulated by ERISA.' Other benefits are not so regulated. This Article dis-
cusses the employer's liability to continue paying insurance premiums for
retirees when the plant has closed and the contract creating those insurance
benefits has expired.
II. THE KURZ-KASCH CASE
Kurz-Kasch operates several plants in Ohio and Indiana. Before 1975 it
operated a plant on South Broadway in Dayton.2 Its contract with Local I I of
the Metal Polishers Union expired on September 15, 1975. The termination
clause of that contract said that a notice to terminate or amend the agreement
would result in termination of the entire agreement.3
Just before the 1975 negotiations, the company's personnel director
wrote the union that "[y]ou are hereby notified that as of September 15, 1975,
any agreement-written, oral or implied-or any conditions of employment or
other understanding now in effect between Kurz-Kasch, Inc. and the Metal
Polishers ... will terminate."-
4
Kurz-Kasch and Local 11 did not reach an agreement in the fall of 1975.
The union struck the plant, and on November 17, 1975, Kurz-Kasch decided
to close the South Broadway plant. It has not reopened.5
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1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp.).
2. Metal Polishers Local No. 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368,369 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The authors
served as counsel for the company in this case, and the views expressed herein should be read with that
understanding. This Article deals solely with the rights of voluntary retirees to insurance premiums and is not
concerned with the developing body of case law on implied obligations not to discharge.
3. Id. at 371.
4. Kurz-Kasch, Inc. v. Metal Polishers Local No. 11, 79-I Lab. Arb. Awards 3455, 3459-60 (1978)
(Chapman, Arb.), complaint dismissed, No. 79-3379 (S.D. Ohio April 5, 1977), dismissal vacated, appeal
remanded, 642 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).
5. Metal Polishers Local No. II v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 369 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
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Since the plant had been in operation for a number of years, retired
employees represented by the union received retirement benefits under a
negotiated pension plan. For these retirees the company also paid premiums
on group life and health insurance. The expired agreement stated that "[tflhe
company agrees to pay ... group insurance premiums required for the con-
tinuation of existing employee group insurance" 6 for retirees meeting certain
conditions. On December 16, 1975, the company wrote retired employees
that, as of January 1 and February 1, 1976, respectively, the premiums for life
and health insurance would no longer be carried by the company. All Kurz-
Kasch employees associated with the South Broadway plant were affected:
the company paid no further group life and health premiums for anyone.
Metal Polishers Local 1I brought suit on June 9, 1976, 7 in the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The complaint claimed that the com-
pany's termination of the group policies of retirees (but only retirees) de-
prived them of a vested right. Since the expired contract committed the
parties to grieve and arbitrate "any dispute," the district court ordered the
parties to submit the dispute over premiums for retirees to an impartial ar-
bitrator.8
Following the court's order, Arbitrator Charles Chapman heard the claim
on September 6, 1978. On December 28, 1978, Chapman issued his award.9
He found that Kurz-Kasch was not obligated to continue paying premiums for
retirees. His analysis was pragmatic. Since both parties "cost out" the con-
tract proposals they present to each other, generally for the period the con-
tract will run, it is highly unlikely that the parties anticipated costs beyond the
term of the agreement; benefits extending beyond the contract term "would
have to be clearly spelled out in the contract or be reasonably inferred from
the language of the contract." 0 The Kurz-Kasch group insurance clause
referred to group plans "presently in effect" and further provided that retired
employees could continue their participation in existing group plans. " These
clauses imposed on the company an obligation to pay premiums only during
the duration of the contract; consequently, the company could terminate the
insurance premium payments after the collective bargaining agreement ex-
pired. The arbitrator considered evidence that during prior negotiations the
union had demanded that retirees receive the same benefits negotiated for
active employees.
This would lead [me] to the conclusion that, in bargaining for the insurance pro-
grams, the retirees obtained no benefits greater than those that were accorded to
the then present employees of the bargaining unit. Thus, when the insurance
benefits for regular employees ended with the termination of the contract, those
benefits also ended for retirees. 12
6. Id. at 371.
7. Id. at 369.
8. Id. at 370.
9. Kurz-Kasch, Inc. v. Metal Polishers, 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards 3455, 3456 (1978) (Chapman, Arb.).
10. Id. at 3462.
II. Id. at 3458.
12. Id. at 3456.
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After Chapman's decision, the district court dismissed the union's com-
plaint. 13
The union's appeal to the Sixth Circuit' 4 produced a startling result.
Ignoring those cases holding that the district court has the option-indeed, the
obligation-to order arbitration when the contract permits,' 5 the court of
appeals said that under the contract arbitration could be invoked only at the
union's request and that, since the union had not requested arbitration, the
district court's arbitration order was incorrect. The court abruptly ignored the
generous federal endorsement of labor arbitration that began in 1960. 6
Back to the district court the case went. Kurz-Kasch urged that court to
give the arbitration award conclusive (or great) weight. Perhaps stung by the
court of appeals' reversal, the district court took great pains to say that the
"arbitrator's decision can only be considered a nullity." '7 The court, how-
ever, then reached the same result. 
8
The court relied on the clearly expressed termination clause, and on the
ambiguous group insurance clause, to conclude that under the contract insur-
ance benefits for retirees "were dependent both on the existence of a general
employee [group insurance] policy, and the duration of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement." '9 Going beyond the arbitrator's analysis, the court
addressed the further question "whether the retired employees may have a
vested right to the insurance benefits provided for by contract 'as implied by
their total relationship to the company, separate and apart from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement."' 20 The court concluded that to imply such an obliga-
tion would subvert the intentions of the parties because their collective bar-
gaining agreement made the benefits terminable.2 '
III. PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION
Courts facing the survival or nonsurvival of retirees' group insurance
upon plant closure are confronted with an immediate problem. Professor
Summers put it well:
The difficulty here is that the parties had no intent one way or the other on the
specific issue when they negotiated the last agreement, or any of those which
preceded it. No one at any time even broached the question of what would happen
13. Metal Polishers Local No. I I v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 370 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
14. Metal Polishers Local No. II v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 642 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
915 (1981).
15. Shaffer v. Mitchell Transp., Inc., 635 F.2d 261, 264, 267 n.12 (3d Cir. 1980); International Detective
Serv., Inc. v. International Bhd. of'Teamsters Local 251, 614 F.2d 29, 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1980); IBEW Local 278 v.
Jetero Corp., 88 L.R.R.M. 2182 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd, 496 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1974).
16. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.. 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
17. Metal Polishers Local No. I I v. Kurz-Kasch. Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 370 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
18. Id. at 374.
19. Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 373 (quoting Upholsterers' Int*1 Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir.
1967)).
21. Metal Polishers Local No. II v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 373 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
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if the Company went out of business. There is no evidence that such a possibility
even crossed either party's mind. On the contrary, all of the discussions and all of
the provisions in the Agreement proceeded from the premise that the plant would
continue in operation for an indefinite period.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the words of the Agreement provide no
clear guide; if they seemed to, it would only be an illusion, an unintended result.
The Company correctly confronts the words as ambiguous. It is true that the word
"continue" carries with it the idea of a future obligation to retirees, but it contains
no defined time dimension as to how long or under what circumstances that
obligation continues. Certainly, it does not speak directly to whether that obliga-
tion continues after the business has been terminated.
22
Summers is right. Most collective bargaining agreements are negotiated
by corporate personnel directors and union business agents who are skilled at
solving the immediate problems, or at least those problems that will last two
or three years. The negotiators do not contemplate (or prefer to ignore) what
will happen if the whole deal goes sour.
Upholsterers' International Union v. American Pad & Textile Co. 2 is
just that case. The Sixth Circuit held that the employer was obligated to
continue to provide eligible retirees with life insurance coverage, 4 basing its
conclusion on two separate, but related, paragraphs of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The first paragraph said that the factory group insurance plan
would continue in full force and effect for the duration of the "current"
contract. 25 The second, immediately following, said that any employee with
fifteen or more years of continuous service who retired at age 65 "will con-
tinue" with 2,000 dollars of life insurance. 26 The company proposed that this
second paragraph meant "continue for the life of the agreement"; the union
took the position that "continue" meant "for the term of employee retire-
ment." Since the first paragraph expressly limited employee benefits to the
life of the agreement but the second did not, the court adopted the interpreta-
tion of "continue" urged by the union.27
Surely plaintiff's proof was sketchy. No court should be required to
reach a conclusion of this financial magnitude on such a slender basis. 28 The
opinion shows no record evidence of facts that are basic to contract construc-
tion, such as the length of time these clauses had been in the agreement or the
negotiating history surrounding each clause. Nor does the opinion show if the
obligations created by each clause were negotiated together, as part of the
22. Roxbury Carpet Co. v. Textile Workers, 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 4935, 4937 (1973) (Summers, Arb.).
23. 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967).
24. Id. at 428.
25. Id. at 428 n.3.
26. Id. at 427.
27. Id. at 428.
28. Indeed, in distinguishing American Pad the district court in Kurz-Kasch adverted to the absence of any
"closely related" language that would expressly limit the term of the contract. Metal Polishers Local No. I I v.
Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368, 373 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Although other evidence also indicated only a
terminable obligation, it is ironic that the strained use of negative implication in American Pad could be used to
distinguish the case and even to support an opposite result.
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same economic package. Significantly, the opinion contains no evidence of
the text of preceding agreements to bolster a conclusion that changed inter-
pretations were intended.
This evidence is relevant.29 In United Steelworkers v. Midvale-
Heppenstahl Co. 30 the court found an ongoing obligation to pay insurance
premiums after plant closure in this language from the 1975 contract: "Life
insurance premium for pensioners shall be paid by the company during the life
of the pensioner. Life insurance for pensioners retiring under this Agreement
shall be $2,500.00."'31 More unambiguous language would be hard to imagine.
Yet bearing Professor Summers' warning in mind, the language alone does not
indicate that the parties considered the circumstance of plant closure-or
anything beyond a three-year contract.
Much stronger evidence, not referred to in the court's opinion, supports
its result. In 1975 the parties substituted "the life of the pensioner" for the
phrase "the term of this agreement" after the company stopped paying
premiums for retirees during a strike.32 The court could have relied on the
traditional canon that, when language is changed, a changed interpretation is
intended. Furthermore, following expiration of the contract, but before plant
closure, the company gave the following response to a questionnaire:
Q: What happens to a pensioner's insurance coverage if the Midvale-Heppenstahl
plant should close?
A: Life insurance premiums for pensioners shall be paid by the Company during
the life of the pensioner; Blue Cross coverage for which a pensioner is eligible
shall be paid for by the Company until the labor agreement is terminated. (The
above also applies to dependents of pensioners.) 33
The company construed the clause against its own interest to require con-
tinued payment of retirees' life insurance premiums after plant closure.
Midvale-Heppenstahl could claim that the changed interpretation cov-
ered only strike periods-the immediate cause of the change. But its agree-
ment to be bound beyond the term of the agreement is apparent from its
acquiescence to the language change and from its acknowledgment of the
obligation in the questionnaire. The district court's decision is weakened by
its disregard of strong evidence to support its reading of the contract.
The bare contract rarely tells its judicial reader whether a benefit sur-
vives its expiration. Yet sometimes a court has only the bare contract on
which to base its decision. The evidentiary void is filled by imaginative ad-
vocacy and, perhaps, the court's own predilections. Still, if plaintiff is re-
quired to prove affirmatively that plant closure was considered by the parties
29. But see Local 46 1, IUE v. Singer Co., 540 F. Supp. 442,447 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1982) (cannot consider parol
evidence if collective bargaining agreement is clear and unambiguous).
30. 94 Lab. Cas. 20,940 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1982).
31. Id. at 20,940 (emphasis added).
32. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, United Steelworkers v. Midvale-
Heppenstahl Co., 94 Lab. Cas. 20,940 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff d mem., 676 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 1-3.
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and that benefits were negotiated in anticipation of this possibility, American
Pad would be decided the other way.
One looks in vain to the cases for a discussion of the elements of plain-
tiff's prima facie case and allocation of the burden of proof. Given the rarity of
evidence of contract negotiations, this silence is not surprising. These con-
siderations are nonetheless important and could well determine the outcome
of a suit. Many decisions speak casually (and categorically) of "vested bene-
fits." Clearly, when a worker retires his benefits "vest"; he has performed all
the services required to entitle him to any promised benefits. But a vesting
analysis does not answer, unless by ipse dixit, what those benefits are-
including how long (and under what circumstances) they continue. If courts
clarified the parties' burden of proof,34 uncertainty would be diminished and
perhaps much litigation would cease.
Finally, courts should not blithely lump together all fringe benefits that
may accrue after the contract expires. For example, vacation pay and sever-
ance pay are in some ways similar to group insurance but in some ways are
not. Again, American Pad35 illustrates courts' failure to distinguish between
different types of fringe benefits. The Sixth Circuit asserted, without explana-
tion, that its conclusion was supported by Smith v. Kingsport Press, Inc.,3 6 a
vacation-pay case. Yet in Kingsport Press the evidence showed a distinct
one-for-one relationship between each year of work tendered and an entitle-
ment to vacation (whether one week or more, depending on years of service)
accruing the following year. The contract expired, and the employees struck
after the year's work was performed, but before the arbitrary (and, in the
court's view, inconsequential) vacation eligibility date arrived. 37 In these cir-
cumstances the court refused to allow the company the windfall of avoiding
its vacation obligations.38
34. One court has done just that:
In light of the inherent duration of the retirement status beyond any particular contract, the nature
of retirement benefits as deferred compensation for service, and the federal policy in favor of the
protection of legitimate employee expectations, it is reasonable to adopt a rule of construction which
creates a presumption in favor of vested retirement benefits in the absence of clear evidence indicating
a contrary intention.
UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 3 EBC 1369, 1375 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
Unfortunately, all of the underlying premises are open to serious question. First, employment, like retire-
ment, typically extends beyond any particular contract. Under federal law, strikers are regarded as employees.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Yet employers commonly terminate insurance coverage for strikers-indeed, the
union did not contend in Cadillac Malleable Iron Co. that the company acted improperly in doing so for its
"active striking employees." 3 EBC 1369, 1392 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
Second, the notion of "deferred compensation" was belied in the case itself, because the insurance benefits
negotiated between company and union were typically extended to workers already retired. Id. at 1371.
The court derived the "federal policy" from the declared purpose of ERISA "to protect ... employee
expectations" regarding their anticipated retirement benefits. Id. at 1375. The court omitted to note the distinc-
tion between pension plans and insurance plans in the operation of that Act. See infra note 65.
35. Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427, 428 (6th Cir. 1967).
36. 366 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1966).
37. Id. at 419-20.
38. Id. But see California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 4 EBC 1230 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (federal district court
issued preliminary injunction protecting employers from state penalties for nonpayment of vacation pay; case
includes ERISA and NLRA preemption claims).
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Surface parallels do exist between insurance benefits for retirees and
vacation pay. For both the vacations in Kingsport Press and the insurance for
retired workers, the employees have put in their requisite service. In both, the
employees' enjoyment of the benefit is deferred. Kingsport's obligation for
vacation pay is vested and arises on the vacation eligibility date in the follow-
ing year. American Pad's obligation for insurance for retirees is vested and
arises-in installments-each month, after the employees retire.
But vacation pay and retirees' insurance benefits, despite apparent sim-
ilarity, are critically different. Vacation pay is an annual event, clearly geared
to continuous service. Theoretically, employees are entitled to a rest after
their required period of work. When an employee quits or retires, he ceases
accruing (or earning) vacation pay. On the other hand, retirement alone does
not end insurance coverage, because the parties may agree that it will not.
Although vacations are paid once, and insurance premiums in install-
ments, this distinction is not controlling. An employer can contract to pay a
debt either way. But analyzing how an obligation is to be paid does not answer
whether the parties have originally contracted for the debt.
IV. PREMIUMS FOR THE INSURANCE OF RETIREES: VESTED OR NOT?
A. The Ohio Cases
Two Ohio cases39 are widely cited to support claims that retirement
insurance premiums are vested rights that cannot be defeated. As with most
frequently cited cases, the claims made for the holdings are far broader than
the holdings themselves.
Cantor v. Berkshire Life Insurance Co. concerned an insurance agent
who was employed under a "career contract" that supplied retirement in-
come according to a specified formula if the agent worked a given number of
years. Either party could terminate the contract by giving thirty days written
notice. Plaintiff agent served his time and retired; defendant insurance com-
pany tried to cancel his contract and thus to lower his retirement income. The
parties agreed that plaintiff served his time with the company, developed
business, and reached the mandatory retirement age.4'
In the lower courts the insurance company was successful in asserting
that a termination clause is a termination clause, and because the termination
clause at issue had no limitation, the company could properly terminate the
contract at will, as it did.42 The Ohio Supreme Court framed the issue in terms
that foretold the result: "whether the rights of an employee in a noncon-
tributory retirement system established by an employer may be divested by
39. Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co.,
171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960).
40. 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960).
41. Id. at 406-07, 171 N.E.2d at 520.
42. Id. at 407, 171 N.E.2d at 520.
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the employer after the employee has fulfilled all the conditions relating to his
right to retirement benefits.",
43
Noting that pensions were once regarded as a gratuity from the employer
that could be terminated at his whim, the court said that retirement benefits
were increasingly treated as rights vested in the individual. The consideration
flowing to the employer was the individual's observance of all terms of the
employment agreement. Since service was the consideration, whether the
employee contributed to the retirement program was immaterial.
44
Reasoning that a retirement program is a basic part of the employee's
remuneration (much as wages), the court concluded that "after an employee
has accepted employment under such circumstances, [the employer cannot]
withdraw or terminate the program after an employee has complied with all
the conditions entitling him to retirement rights thereunder." 45 When the
employee complied with all the terms of the employment agreement, he
created a vested right that could not be defeated by the termination clause.
46
Seven years later the court in Sheehy v. Seion, Inc. 47 held that insurance
benefits of retirees could not be changed no matter what the cancellation
clause in individual employment contracts said. Seiberling Rubber Company
was acquired in early 1965 by Seilon. Seilon discovered the actuarial expense
of carrying the medical benefits of retirees and decided to cancel retirees'
insurance.48 The Sheehy court restated Cantor in broad terms:
The Cantor case stands for the general proposition that, where an employee
has complied with the conditions of his contract of employment, benefits have
been promised and conferred on him by his employer as an inducement for the
continuance of his service to the employer, and such employee reaches the spec-
ified retirement age, he acquires by the promise and agreement of his employer, a
vested right to those benefits, and, in the absence of good and sufficient cause for
forfeiture, he may not be deprived thereof, notwithstanding a proviso in the con-
tract of employment to the contrary.49
The Ohio courts thus have read as insignificant a termination clause: it cannot
defeat fully vested rights. When individuals work for a stated period of time
and in anticipation of an announced retirement program, retirement benefits,
whether pensions or insurance premiums, may not be cancelled because they
are too expensive. The courts, however, offer no guidance on a question
arising from a typical set of facts: What is the legal result of an adjustment of
benefits? If Seilon had not cancelled the insurance of retirees but had merely
reduced insurance coverage, and in turn increased payments under the pen-
sion plan or offered additional and unrelated insurance credits, the value of
43. Id.
44. Id. at 408-09, 171 N.E.2d at 521.
45. Id. at 410, 171 N.E.2d at 522.
46. Id.
47. 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967).
48. Id. at 242-43, 227 N.E.2d at 230.
49. Id. at 243, 227 N.E.2d at 230.
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the overall benefits might remain the same, or indeed improve, but the bene-
fits themselves would not be the same.
Companies occasionally adjust parts of the retirement package as they
gain experience with it. If, for example, a company were to add dental cover-
age to its insurance program for active employees, but did not do so for retired
employees, it would be hard to claim that the insurance benefits for retirees
should be increased accordingly. The former employees would not have re-
tired with the inducement of dental coverage because it was not available
when they retired. Such a claim by retirees would be convincing only if
retirees were promised benefit increases equal to those given active workers.
Underlying both Cantor and Sheehy is judicial concern for the unequal
bargaining power of the retiree in dealing with his employer. This concern is
not limited to Ohio courts, for federal courts are equally sympathetic to re-
tirees, regardless of whether the retirees are represented in collective bargain-
ing.
B. The Federal Cases
Unions negotiate wages and benefits for active employees, benefits for
active employees' retirement, and benefits for retirees as well. The possible
scope of that negotiation is illustrated in Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co. 50 In
that case the Cincinnati Post, in return for concessions by the typographical
union, agreed that its printers would be "continuously employed for the re-
mainder of their working lives by the Post." 5' When the Post later terminated
its printers, it argued that the lifetime employment agreement expired with the
underlying collective bargaining agreement that established the terms of the
employment.52
The Sixth Circuit disagreed. It enforced the lifetime agreement's specific
statement that it "supersede[d] any and all existing contracts and/or agree-
ments between the parties and [was] permanent unless cancelled by mutual
agreement of both parties.'' 53
Regarding benefits for retirees, Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co.54 establishes that the benefits are a permissive subject of
bargaining. In the argot of the specialty, this holding means unions and em-
ployers can request, urge, or cajole (but not insist on) talks on the subject. 55
Pittsburgh Plate Glass, in which the retirees' group insurance coverage had
been negotiated in 1950, illustrates that collective bargaining has long con-
50. 661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 668 F.2d 878, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2272 (1982).
51. Id. at 1118.
52. Id. at 1121.
53. Id.
54. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
55. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. ofBorg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); cf. Cox, Labor Decisions
of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1074-78 (1958).
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templated benefits for retirees. Unions do not need the indulgence and im-
plicit assumptions of Sheehy and Cantor.
American Pad56 carries some of that indulgence over into the federal
arena. As noted, the Sixth Circuit's distinction between one paragraph of the
collective bargaining agreement and the next is very unconvincing. Practical
negotiators probably initialed paragraph two, heaved a sigh of relief, and went
on to the next problem. Their very last consideration was the theory of nega-
tive implications that enabled the Sixth Circuit to reach its sympathetic
result. 5
7
United Steelworkers v. Midvale-Heppenstahl Co.5" rests on much firmer
ground. The evidence presented by the union, including a comparison of
preceding agreements, the union's negotiating strategy in securing contract
changes, and the contemporaneous construction of the contract, against in-
terest, by the company, shows that the court gave effect to the parties' nego-
tiated benefits for retirees.59
The holding in United Steelworkers v. Manitowoc Co. 60 is hard to justify
on any basis. The contract obligated the company "to assume the full obliga-
tion to all employees who retire ... as regards the ... life insurance to be
paid by the company.", 61 Just as the word "continue" in American Pad was
ambiguous regarding the duration of retirees' benefits, this insurance clause
did not indicate how long the company agreed to "assume the full obligation"
of insurance premiums for workers. Yet the court found "the full vesting of
the right to life insurance benefits for the duration of the retirement period to
qualified retirees.",
62
This result is absurd. Nothing in the contract even remotely suggested a
continuation of rights for anyone beyond the expiration of the agreement. But
the sympathies of the district judge were quite enough: "Further, this con-
clusion logically flows from the policy consideration implicit in American Pad
towards the vesting of retiree rights when the employee service called for is
fully performed.", 63 But the policy considerations "implicit" in American
Pad, however, confused the posture of the individual dealing directly with his
employer and the individual whose retirement benefits are negotiated through
56. Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967).
57. Id. at 428. In American Pad the court of appeals also accepted the district court's denial of summary
judgment, 263 F. Supp. 765, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1965), to a second class of retirees-those who retired after a
collective agreement with an express termination clause was signed. (Before that, the separate insurance
supplement had no termination provision.) This agreement and the termination clause in effect made the
retirees' insurance paragraph indistinguishable from the preceding paragraph relied on by the Sixth Circuit.
American Pad thus implicitly rejects the Ohio court's refusal to give effect to a termination clause.
58. 94 Lab. Cas. 20,940 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd mem., 676 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1982).
59. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-3, United Steelworkers v. Midvale-
Heppenstahl Co., 94 Lab. Cas. 20,940 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd mem., 676 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment granted).
60. Nos. 3041, 3057, slip op. (E.D. Mich. June 10, 1975).
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id.
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collective bargaining. When a union has actively negotiated for retirees, a
court should vigorously examine the contract and its bargaining history-and
indeed require that evidence-before reading an expensive and unintended
(or unanticipated) commitment into a contract.
Just as a collective bargaining agent can negotiate an increase in the
benefits of retirees, so too can it negotiate a decrease in those benefits. In
Turner v. Local 302, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,64 the fund that
provided benefits for retirees experienced severe cash flow problems because
of an increase in the proportion of retired employees to active employees. In
response the employer and the union negotiated a reduction in benefits and a
charge to those retirees who wished to remain in the medical program. The
plaintiff claimed that he had a vested right in the level of insurance benefits in
effect on the date of his retirement. If vested, those rights could not be altered
without his agreement. The negotiated reduction did not affect plaintiff's
pension; only his medical benefits were changed. 65 The Ninth Circuit rejected
Turner's argument that his insurance benefits vested.66
The court looked to the bargaining history to find that the medical ben-
efits for retirees "could be terminated at the end of any one of the collective
bargaining agreements" and that the benefits could properly be increased or
decreased. 67 The plaintiff's consent was not an essential ingredient of any
change.
Turner clearly illustrates the differing postures of the individual employee
and the worker represented by a collective bargaining agent. In Cantor68 and
Sheehy69 the individuals performed the services required of them, and their
employers were estopped from changing benefits on which these individuals
theoretically relied in consenting to work for as long as they did. The reliance
of the employees in these cases on anticipated retirement benefits is largely
speculative. They may have been equally attracted by the current wage scale,
the quality of the supervision, or the chance for advancement-in short, any
one of a thousand considerations that lead an individual to accept and stay on
any job. Retirement benefits were probably a stronger inducement at age sixty
than at age thirty, but proof of this attraction would be almost impossible to
obtain and, if obtained, would likely be highly self-serving.
In United Rubber Workers v. Lee National Corp.70 the court reached the
same result as Turner, and articulated an economic premise that may or may
not be accurate:
64. 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 1225. The statutory vesting requirements of ERISA apply to pension plans, not to welfare benefit
plans such as life and health insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1974). See also Turner v. Local 302, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1225 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979); Metal Polishers Local No. I I v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F.
Supp. 368, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
66. 604 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1979).
67. Id. at 1225.
68. Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960).
69. Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967).
70. 323 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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The intent to terminate as to all employees, including retirees, is fortified by the
undisputed fact that group insurance, which rests upon the insurability of the
entire group, would be unobtainable, except possibly at prohibitive rates, for a
group limited to retirees, who are for the most part over 65 years of age.
71
The merits of this economic analysis are severely challenged by Arbitrator
Summers in Roxbury Carpet Co. v. Textile Workers, quoted above. 72
C. Arbitrators and Vested Rights
Those who view arbitrators as misty-eyed sentimentalists will be sur-
prised to discover arbitrators are far less likely than a federal court to imply
vesting of retirees' insurance benefits. Illustrative is Coulter Manufacturing
Ltd.73 Phasing out its operations, Coulter told all employees, including re-
tirees, that after the existing collective agreement lapsed, insurance coverage
would have to be arranged through the carrier. 74 Holding that the company
was not obligated to continue paying insurance premiums for anyone-includ-
ing retirees-beyond the term of the contract, the arbitrator stated:
There is no term to these benefits expressed in the collective agreement. It does
not follow, however, that the company is obliged to provide such benefits for the
lifetimes of the persons concerned. These benefits, which might indeed have been
changed in subsequent negotiations, run, like the other benefits provided by the
collective agreement, for the term of the collective agreement.
The arbitrator recognized that benefits for retirees are collectively bargained.
Contract terms at least as favorable to the employee as those in American
Pad were present in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.76 The company agreed
to pay the premiums for group health and Blue Cross coverage for early
retirees between the ages of sixty-two and sixty-five. After some employees
accepted early retirement, the company closed some of its warehouses and
terminated those persons' insurance benefits.77 The arbitrator found:
The fact that a retired employee receives pension benefits does not, by itself,
subsume any relationship which would entitle the employee (or the Union) to
other rights-such as the right to require the employer to make premium payments
to keep alive insurance policies providing for benefits in the event of sickness
occurring after the termination of the employment relationship of the retired em-
ployee and his employer.
78
71. Id. at 1188.
72. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. In UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 3 EBC 1369 (W.D.
Mich. 1982), the parties agreed, and the court found, that a retiree-only group would impose "significantly
higher" costs. Id. at 1372.
73. 50 Lab. Arb. 1055 (1972) (Weatherill, Arb.).
74. Id. at 1058.
75. Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).
76. 67 Lab. Arb. 125 (1972) (Seitz, Arb.).
77. Id. at 126.
78. Id. at 127. Accord Duquesne Brewing Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 85 (1972) (Dybeck, Arb.) (employees not
entitled to the continuation of insurance and medical benefits following permanent shutdown of the plant);
White Rock Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. 862 (1972) (Glushien, Arb.) (right to sick-leave pay not "vested" under expired
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INSURANCE PREMIUMS FOR RETIREES
Those arbitrators who have found an obligation to continue insurance
premiums have done so on an express contract clause. A leading example is
American Standard, Inc., 7 in which the company closed its Columbus, Ohio
plant and terminated the payment of insurance premiums for retirees and
others. The insurance clause in the agreement stated that its coverage "shall
be continuedfor the life of the employee in the amount established at the time
the individual employee retires." 0 This express term-and not the policy
implications of American Pad-led the arbitrator to rule that retirees were
entitled to the continuation of their benefits."'
To be sure, just as some judges rationalize their results, some arbitrators
are indulgent. No case better illustrates this point than Roxbury Carpet Co.82
After perceptively noting that parties will rarely anticipate, or provide for, the
contingency of a plant closing, the arbitrator ignored his own understanding.
He demolished the employer's "most forceful argument" by showing that the
actual cost of a retirees-only group was no greater than the cost of including
retirees in a larger group with active employees. 3 But he failed to support his
conclusion that the employer agreed to continue the premiums. Instead, de-
spite his explicit finding that there was no "intent one way or the other on the
specific issue" 84 during any of the negotiations, he concluded that the com-
pany made a promise and assumed the obligation to pay the premiums for the
rest of the retirees' lives. His conclusion is based on nothing more than the
retirees' expectation of lifetime benefits."5
V. CONCLUSION
It is hardly 9tartling that some judges strain to protect the insurance
premiums of retirees, for cancellation of these premiums certainly imposes a
hardship. Since in most cases retirees are already living on a fixed income, the
additional expense of insurance premiums is an unwelcome surprise.
But insurance premiums for older persons are generally very expensive
and the obligation to pay them should be solidly grounded in fact. Retirees
should have to prove, at the very least, that the obligation to pay their insur-
ance premiums, in spite of the closure of the plant, was actively contemplated
by the retirees or their collective bargaining agent.
Furthermore, the presence of a collective bargaining agent is crucial.
Unions can negotiate for retirees, and have done so. If union negotiators have
contract when employees were terminated following plant closing); American Zinc Co., 57 Lab. Arb. 1140
(1971) (Ray, Arb.) (employer not obligated to pay vacation pay to employees terminated in the course of the
phase-out of the employer's business).
79. 57 Lab. Arb. 698 (1971) (Warns, Arb.).
80. Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 700.
82. 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 4935, 4937 (1973) (Summers, Arb.).
83. Id. at 4940.
84. Id. at 4937.
85. Id. at 4938-39.
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not secured this benefit, imaginative judges or arbitrators should not do their
job for them. The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly recognized the difference
between imposed and negotiated benefits:
A rational basis exists for the distinction in the instant cause. As mentioned
earlier, and as stated in the Court of Appeals' opinion below, "[oJur national
recognition of the importance of collective bargaining makes manifest our ac-
knowledgment that through union representation the employee's interests are
better protected. Furthermore, there is patently a difference between asian
negotiated at arm's length and one unilaterally adopted by the employer."
86. Salzi v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 61 Ohio St. 2d 35, 39, 399 N.E.2d 76, 79 (1980).
